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I. Introduction
Patent infringement cases may be the very definition of "high-stakes litiga-
tion." Findings of patent infringement almost always result in the issuance of per-
manent injunctions, and damage awards sometimes reach into the hundreds of mil-
lions of dollars. It should not then be surprising that patent cases are also some of
the most expensive to litigate. If these remedies and the high cost of patent litiga-
tion are not enough to deter would-be infringers, judges also have discretion to
award treble damages and attorney's fees in patent cases. One situation in which
judges may exercise this discretion is when infringement is found to be willful.
Resolution of this willfulness issue therefore becomes extremely important in pat-
ent cases.
One way for an alleged willful infringer to rebut an allegation of willfulness is
to introduce an opinion of counsel. An opinion of counsel evidences the alleged
willful infringer's good faith effort to investigate the validity, enforceability, and
infringement of the patent at issue after receiving notice of potential infringement.
Obviously, however, while the opinion of counsel may conclude that invalidity, un-
enforceability, or non-infringement enabled the party to legally continue the alleg-
edly infringing act, the court could determine that infringement of a valid and en-
forceable patent had occurred.
The issue becomes defining the scope of waiver of attorney-client privilege
and work-product immunity that results when the advice-of-counsel defense is as-
serted in response to an allegation of willful infringement. District courts have
been pondering this issue for two decades, and they have yet to come to any agree-
ment. The courts initially split into two distinct camps. One argued that waiver ex-
tends only to communications between the client and opinion counsel. The other
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extended the waiver to include non-communicated work-product. Only recently a
compromise position developed. It would extend the waiver to include non-
communicated fact work product only. The Federal Circuit, for its part, has yet to
weigh in on the issue or to signal which, if any, of these three approaches the court
would adopt.
This article hypothesizes that the various scopes of waiver adopted by courts
reflect various levels of confidence in the ethical and professional responsibility of
opinion writers. This article also comes to the conclusion that whatever the appro-
priate scope of waiver should be, the Federal Circuit should finally act to announce
that scope. To do so, the Federal Circuit should assert some form-any form--of
appellate jurisdiction.
This article is organized into three parts. The first presents the background
and history of willful patent infringement, the advice-of-counsel defense, and the
attorney-client and the work-product doctrines. The second part examines the vari-
ous approaches to the scope of waiver and identifies the recent development of a
third approach. Finally, the third part recognizes the uncertainty in this area of the
law, identifies the underlying cause of the uncertainty, and analyzes methods of ob-
taining appellate review so that the Federal Circuit can settle the issue or at least
provide district courts with more direction in the exercise of their discretion.
II. The Context: Willful Patent Infringement, the Advice-of-Counsel
Defense, and Exclusionary Rules
A. Willful patent infringement
1. Significance
Trial judges have statutory authority to enhance damages1 and award attor-
ney's fees2 in patent infringement cases. Although no statute specifically identifies
the circumstances in which this discretion may be exercised, the Federal Circuit ap-
proves such awards when infringement is found to be willful.'
Willfulness is a significant issue in patent litigation due to its potential impact
on the size of damage awards. Compensatory damages in patent cases often
amount to more than ten million dollars and sometimes rise into the hundreds of
"[Tihe court may increase the damages up to three times the amount found or assessed." 35
U.S.C. § 284 (2000).
2 "The court in exceptional cases may award reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing party." See
id. § 285 (2000).
See Read Corp. v. Portec, Inc., 970 F.2d 816, 826, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1426, 1434-35 (Fed. Cir.
1992) (willfulness justifies enhanced damages); Rohm & Haas Co. v. Crystal Chem. Co., 736 F.2d
688, 691, 222 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 97, 99 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (willfulness justifies attorney's fees).
However, it should be noted that a finding of willfulness does not require the enhancement of
damages or the awarding of attorney's fees. Jurgens v. CBK, Ltd., 80 F.3d 1566, 1573, 38
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1397, 1402 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
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millions of dollars. 4  Willfulness raises the specter that these already sizable com-
pensatory damage awards may be trebled if the judge invokes the maximum allow-
able enhancement under the statute. 5 Additionally, the cost of bringing a patent in-
fringement case, let alone defending one, is also substantial.6 Thus, the threat of
shifting attorney's fees only adds credence to the importance of willfulness in pat-
ent infringement cases.
Compounding the significance of willfulness determinations, trial court deci-
sions on willfulness are somewhat immune from review. As a question of fact,
willfulness is subject to the clearly erroneous standard of review. 7 The Federal Cir-
cuit has dictated that reversal of a finding of willful infringement will only occur
when "the reviewing court has a definite and firm conviction that the trier of fact
erred.",8  Willfulness is therefore not only significant in patent litigation, but it is
particularly significant at the trial level because these decisions should rarely be
overturned. 9
4 John Dragseth, Note, Coerced Waiver of the Attorney-Client Privilege for Opinions of Counsel in
Patent Litigation, 80 MINN. L. REV. 167 n.2 (1995) ("A recent study of patent cases from 1982-
1994 found that, of 177 cases awarding damages, 61 resulted in damages between $1 million and
$10 million and 25 resulted in damages over $10 million."); see JULm L. DAVID & ALLISON C.
MORAN, AN HISTORICAL LOOK AT PATENT INFRINGEMENT DAMAGE AWARDS, IN INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY INFRINGEMENT DAMAGES 3, 6 (Supp. 1995); see also Minn. Mining and Mfg. Co. v.
Johnson & Johnson Orthopedics, Inc., 976 F.2d 1559, 1563, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321, 1324
(Fed. Cir. 1992) (affirming an award of more than $106 million); Polaroid Corp. v. Eastman Ko-
dak Co., 16 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1481, 1541 (D. Mass. 1990) (awarding more than $900 million);
cf Litton Indus. Inc. v. Honeywell Inc., No. 90-4823, 1995 WL 366468, at *56 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 6,
1995) (granting defendant's renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law and vacating $1.2
billion jury verdict). Moreover, media attention to damage awards in the hundreds of millions of
dollars may influence public perception of the average size of damage awards. See, e.g., Ron
Winslow & Laura Johannes, Johnson & Johnson Wins $324.4 Million In Patent Suit Against Bos-
ton Scientific, WALL ST. J., Dec. 18, 2000, at B4.
See 35 U.S.C. § 284.
6 Taking even a relatively simple patent infringement lawsuit to trial can easily cost a patent owner
$1 million or more. TERENCE P. ROSs, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW: DAMAGES AND REMEDIES §
8.01 (2000). More complex technology or other factors may raise the cost to $2 million or more.
See Richard P. Beem, Recovering Attorney Fees & Damages When Defending Against Bad Faith
Patent Litigation, 80 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 81 n.2 (1998) (citing AIPLA, 1997 Report
of Economic Survey 72, table 24b). Of course, spending on patent infringement litigation also di-
rectly correlates to the amount of money at risk. See AIPLA, 2001 Report of Economic Survey
84-85, table 22.
Gustafson, Inc. v. Intersystems Indus. Prods., Inc., 897 F.2d 508, 510, 13 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1972, 1974 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
SRI Int'l, Inc. v. Advanced Tech. Labs., Inc., 127 F.3d 1462, 1465, 44 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1422,
1424 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
9 However, reversals of willfulness determinations are not as rare as one might think, at least if one
thinks clearly erroneous is the standard the Federal Circuit applies in fact. See, e.g., Jurgens, 80
F.3d at 1570, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1403 (vacating and remanding judge's decision not to impose en-
hanced damages after jury found willfulness); Graco, Inc. v. Binks Mfg. Co., 60 F.3d 785, 792-94,
35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1255, 1260-62 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (reversing finding of willfulness); West-
vaco Corp. v. Int'l Paper Co., 991 F.2d 735, 743, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1353, 1360 (Fed. Cir.
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Due to the potential impact on damages and the lenient standard of review, it
is unsurprising that almost every patent infringement complaint includes an allega-
tion of willfulness ° and that the issue of willfulness is hotly contested at trial.
2. Relationship to enhanced damages"
The law of enhanced damages evolved over time. First, the amount of discre-
tion vested in trial courts has changed. The Patent Act of 1793 required judges to
award enhanced damages.12 However, with the passage of the Patent Act of 1836,
enhanced damages became discretionary,13 and in 1853 the Supreme Court ruled
that the individual merits of each case should be considered before a judge awards
enhanced damages. 14 Current law continues to treat enhanced damages as discre-
tionary. 5 Second, the size of enhanced damage awards has changed. The Patent
Act of 1793 required at least treble damages; 16 however, patent statutes since 1836
have capped enhanced damage awards between two to three times the compensa-
tory damage award.'
7
Current law dictates that a two-step process must be followed before a judge
may enhance damages: "First, the fact-finder must determine whether an infringer
is guilty of conduct upon which increased damages may be based. If so, the court
then determines ... whether, and to what extent, to increase the damages award...
1993) (reversing finding of willfulness); L.A. Gear, Inc. v. Thorn McAn Shoe Co., 988 F.2d 1117,
1127, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1913, 1920 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (reversing finding of no willfulness);
Read, 970 F.2d at 826-30, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1434-38 (reversing finding of willfulness); Gustafson,
897 F.2d at 510, 13 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1975 (reversing finding of willfulness). But see Vulcan Eng'g
Co. v. FATA Aluminum, Inc., 278 F.3d 1366, 1378, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1545, 1553 (Fed. Cir.
2002) (affirming finding of no willfulness); Crystal Semiconductor Corp. v. Tritech Microelec-
tronics Int'l, Inc., 246 F.3d 1336, 1352, 57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1953, 1961 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (af-
firming finding of willfulness); SRI, 127 F.3d at 1468, 44 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1427 (affirming finding
of willfulness); Minn. Mining and Mfg., 976 F.2d 1559, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d 1321 (affirming finding of
willfulness); Ortho Pharm. Corp. v. Smith, 959 F.2d 936, 944, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1119, 1128
(Fed. Cir. 1992) (affirming finding of no willfulness); Underwater Devices Inc. v. Morrison-
Knudsen Co., 717 F.2d 1380, 1389-90, 219 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 569, 576-77 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (affirm-
ing finding of willfulness).
10 Marcia H. Sundeen, The Willfulness Issue in Patent Litigation, 721 PLIIPAT. 703, 707 (2002).
11 Though I am not aware of any empirical data to support the assumption, the trebling of damages
probably strikes more fear in alleged infringers than the awarding of attorney's fees. This is due
to potentially greater monetary consequences from the former. This subsection therefore focuses
the issue of willfulness on how it relates to enhanced damages.
12 See SRI, 127 F.3d at 1468, 44 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1427.
13 See id.
14 See id. (citing Seymour v. McCormick, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 480, 488-89 (1853)).
'5 35 U.S.C § 284.
16 See SR1, 127 F.3d at 1468, 44 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1427.
17 See id.
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1118 As to the first question, increased damages may be based upon willful patent
infringement.1 9 The determination of willfulness must be made in view of the total-
ity of the circumstances, and it must be proven by clear and convincing evidence. 20
It is unclear, however, whether this first inquiry should be subjective, objec-
tive, or both. On the one hand, the Federal Circuit has stated that the question of
willfulness is "by definition a question of the actor's intent"21 and requires "a de-
termination as to a state of mind.,2 2 With this language, the Federal Circuit frames
the issue as a subjective inquiry into the state of mind of the infringer at the time of
the infringement. On the other hand, the Federal Circuit has also stated that the is-
sue is "whether a prudent person would have had sound reason to believe that the
patent was not infringed or was invalid or unenforceable." 23 In this light, the issue
becomes an objective inquiry into the reasonableness of the infringer's actions at
the time of infringement.24 The Federal Circuit has not resolved the issue, although
some opinion language suggests that both the subjective and objective approaches
are appropriate.
25
Once a finding of willfulness is made using either form of inquiry by the trier
of fact, the second step is for the court to use its discretion to determine whether
and to what extent to increase damages based on the totality of circumstances.26
The Federal Circuit has compiled a list of factors appropriate for trial courts to con-
sider when deciding whether punitive damages are appropriate.27 This same list is
18 Jurgens, 80 F.3d at 1570, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1399.
19 Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1461, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1169, 1179 (Fed.
Cir. 1998).
20 Gustafson, 897 F.2d at 510-11, 13 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1974.
21 Id. at 510, 13 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1974; see also Ortho Pharm., 959 F.2d at 944,22 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1126.
22 Read, 970 F.2d at 828, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1436.
23 SR!, 127 F.3d at 1465, 44 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1424.
24 It is important to note that the objective approach does not direct an inquiry into the reasonable-
ness of the attorney's actions or opinion from the standard of a reasonable patent attorney. The
question is instead the reasonableness of the infringer's reliance on the opinion.
25 See, e.g., SRI, 127 F.3d at 1465, 44 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1424 ("[T]he issue of willfulness not only raises
issues of reasonableness and prudence, but is often accompanied by questions of intent, belief, and
credibility.").
26 Jurgens, 80 F.3d at 1570, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1399.
27 The factors include:
(1)whether deliberate copying occurred;
(2)whether the infringer investigated the patent and formed a good-faith belief in invalidity or
noninfringement thereof,
(3)the infringer's behavior during litigation;
(4)the infringer's size and financial condition;
(5)the closeness of the case;
(6)the duration of the infringer's misconduct;
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used to determine the proper extent of punitive damages to impose. 28 However, the
"[t]he paramount determination in deciding to grant enhancement and the amount
thereof is the egregiousness of the defendant's conduct ....
3. Purpose and effect
The Federal Circuit has considered the theoretical underpinnings of willful-
ness as it relates to patent infringement and concluded that willful patent infringe-
ment is a tort that arises upon deliberate or wanton disregard for the property rights
of a patentee.30 The primary purposes of increased damages 31 in the willfulness
context are therefore both to punish culpable actors and to deter infringement.32
In practice, the willfulness issue affects the actions of parties that are put on
notice of potential patent infringement. Once a party has actual notice of a pat-
entee's rights, that party has an affirmative duty of due care to avoid infringe-
ment.33 The affirmative duty includes determining whether a contemplated activity
constitutes infringement of a valid and enforceable patent.34 The necessary corol-
lary is that knowledge of possible infringement cannot be ignored without conse-
35quence.
B. The advice-of-counsel defense
1. Analyzing the defense
Seeking the competent legal advice of a patent attorney is just one manner in
which due care may be exercised.36 Indeed, the Federal Circuit has recognized that
(7)any remedial action taken by the infringer;
(8)the infringer's motivation for harm; and
(9)whether the infringer attempted to conceal misconduct.
Read, 970 F.2d at 826-27, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1435-36. Note that not all of these factors directly re-
late to the issue of willfulness.
28 Id. at 826, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1435.
29 Id.
30 See Vulcan Eng'g, 278 F.3d at 1378, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1553.
3 1 For a detailed discussion on the purpose of increased damage awards, see 7 DONALD S. CHISUM,
CHISUM ON PATENTS § 20.0314] [b] [iii] (2002).
32 SRI, 127 F.3d at 1468, 44 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1427.
33 Ortho Pharm., 959 F.2d at 944, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1125.
34 id.
35 See Kloster Speedsteel AB v. Crucible Inc., 793 F.2d 1565, 1580 n.11, 230 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 81,
91 n.ll (Fed. Cir. 1986).
36 Another way in which due care may be exercised is attempting to design around a patent. See
SRI, 127 F.3d at 1465, 44 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1424.
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the usual course of action upon receiving knowledge of potential infringement is to
seek an opinion of counsel.37
An opinion of counsel is usually a letter 38 drafted by a patent attorney directed
to an alleged infringer regarding one or more of the following topics: validity, en-
forceability, and infringement of a patent. 39 The willfulness issue usually translates
into to an analysis of the opinion of counsel itself and the surrounding circum-
stances.40 However, the willfulness issue does not depend on the legal correctness
of the opinion of counsel. 41 "Indeed, the question arises only where counsel was
wrong., 42 After all, only infringers can be found to be willful infringers.
Where an advice-of-counsel defense is asserted, the issue becomes whether
the opinion is "thorough enough, as combined with other factors, to instill a belief
in the infringer that a court might reasonably hold the patent is invalid, not in-
fringed, or unenforceable. 4 3 Note that the issue of whether a court should conduct
a subjective or objective inquiry or both arises again in the context of the advice-of-
counsel defense. Here the subjective inquiry would focus attention on the state of
mind of the infringer with regard to the opinion of counsel specifically. The issue
would be whether the infringer actually believed the veracity of the contents of the
opinion of counsel. The objective inquiry, of course, would instead focus on the
reasonableness of the beliefs.44
The Federal Circuit has recognized both the subjective and objective ap-
proaches in the context of the advice-of-counsel defense, reasoning that both the
infringer's "intent and reasonable beliefs are the primary focus. '45 In practice,
however, the objective inquiry predominates. Objective evidence must be reviewed
to determine whether reliance was reasonable, including whether the opinion itself
lays an "adequate foundation based on a review of all necessary facts. ' 46  The rea-
sonableness of any reliance on an opinion of counsel depends upon the opinion's
37 See, e.g., Vulcan Eng'g, 278 F.3d at 1378, 61 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1553; Minn. Mining and Mfg., 976
F.2d at 1580, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1339; Ortho Pharm., 959 F.2d at 944, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1125;
Read, 970 F.2d at 828, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1437.
38 Technically the opinion of counsel may be oral, but the Federal Circuit has discouraged oral opin-
ions. See Minn. Mining and Mfg., 976 F.2d at 1580, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1339.
39 See Ortho Pharm., 959 F.2d at 944, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1126.
40 Id.; Minn. Mining and Mfg., 976 F.2d at 1580-81, 24 U.S.P.Q. at 1339.
41 Ortho Pharm., 959 F.2d at 944, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1126.
42 id.
43 Id.
44 Again, note that the issue is not the reasonableness of the opinion itself.
45 Ortho Pharm., 959 F.2d at 944, 22 U.S.P.Q. at 1126.
46 Westvaco, 991 F.2d at 743, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1360.
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authoritativeness, thoroughness, and objectiveness.47 The Federal Circuit, some-
what unfortunately, has described this inquiry as one concerning "competence. ''4
The following quotation from an important Federal Circuit decision on the is-
sue of willfulness summarizes and sheds light on the appropriate inquiry. While
reading it, note the court's vacillation from a subjective to an objective inquiry:
Willfulness is a determination as to a state of mind. One who has actual notice of an-
other's patent rights has an affirmative duty to respect those rights. That affirmative
duty normally entails obtaining advice of legal counsel although the absence of such ad-
vice does not mandate a finding of willfulness. Those cases where willful infringement
is found despite the presence of an opinion of counsel generally involve situations where
opinion of counsel was either ignored or found to be incompetent. This precedent does
not mean a client must itself be able to evaluate the legal competence of its attorney's
advice to avoid a finding of willfulness. The client would not need the attorney's advice
at all in that event. That an opinion is "incompetent" must be shown by objective evi-
dence. For example, an attorney may not have looked into the necessary facts, and,
thus, there would be no foundation for his opinion. A written opinion may be incompe-
tent on its face by reason of its containing merely conclusory statements without discus-
sion of facts or obviously presenting only a superficial or off-the-cuff analysis.
49
2. Effects of deciding whether to invoke the defense
Of course the opinion of counsel will probably not be evaluated in court
unless the alleged willful infringer actually invokes the advice-of-counsel defense.
50
This decision of whether to invoke the advice-of-counsel defense presents what has
been called a "harsh dilemma." 5 1 The harsh dilemma exists because either deci-
sion-invoking the defense or not-results in significant negative consequences to
the party invoking the defense.52
47 See Jurgens, 80 F.3d at 1572, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1402.
48 Id. Note that the word "competence" obscures the issue because its literal meaning might make
the reasonableness of the opinion itself the central inquiry, not the reasonableness of the in-
fringer's reliance on the opinion. Another way of pointing out the ambiguity is by raising the
question: from whose perspective is competency analyzed? A reasonable attorney? A reasonable
party? The alleged infringer in the particular case? "The issue is whether the client honestly and
reasonably relied on advice of counsel, not whether the attorney giving the advice was competent
or even intellectually honest." Eco Mfg. L.L.C. v. Honeywell Int'l, Inc., No. 1:03-CV-0170-DFH,
2003 WL 1888988, at *5 (S.D. Ind. Apr. 11, 2003) (trademark case). The Read court addresses
this ambiguity.
49 Read, 970 F.2d at 828-29, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1436-37 (citations omitted).
50 Whether an alleged infringer is actually relying on the advice-of-counsel defense is an oft-litigated
matter. See, e.g., Solaia Tech. L.L.C. v. Jefferson Smurfit Corp., No. 01C6641, 2002 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 14562 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 7, 2002) (refusing to order an alleged willful infringer to decide
whether it would rely on the advice-of-counsel defense).
51 James Y. Go, Comment, Patent Attorneys and the Attorney-Client Privilege, 35 SANTA CLARA L.
REV. 611, 638-39 (1995).
52 As two commentators have noted, the decision whether to assert an advice-of-counsel defense pre-
sents a "damned if you do, damned if you don't" situation. M. Patricia Thayer & Elizabeth A.
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On the one hand, a decision not to invoke the advice-of-counsel defense al-
lows for the drawing of adverse inferences.5 3 Although the non-asserted opinion of
counsel may be shielded from discovery as a privileged communication,54 the trier
of fact may appropriately draw a negative inference if no opinion of counsel is dis-
closed. 55 That is, the trier of fact may assume either that the alleged willful in-
fringer did not obtain an opinion of counsel or that any opinion of counsel obtained
was unfavorable.
56
On the other hand, when the advice-of-counsel defense is invoked, the alleged
willful infringer waives the attorney-client privilege and perhaps work-product im-
munity as well. 57 However, the scope of this waiver is unclear.5 8 Nevertheless,
once the trial judge determines the scope of the waiver, the Federal Circuit only re-
views the decision for abuse of discretion. 9 In light of these circumstances, at least
two practitioners advocate not invoking the advice-of-counsel defense even when it
is available. This is due, in part, to the potential for courts to use the defense as a
"crowbar to open up a wide range of otherwise privileged material. ' '60 The proper
scope of the resulting waiver is the topic of this article. First, however, the attor-
ney-client privilege and work-product doctrine will be explored.
Brown, Tendering Advice of Counsel in Patent Litigation: Damned if You Do, Damned if You
Don't, 9 No. 18 ANDREWS INrELL. PROP. LITIG. REP. 9 (2003).
53 L.A. Gear, 988 F.2d at 1126, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1919. However, note that the Federal Circuit is
currently reviewing this practice. Knorr-Bremse Systeme Fuer Nutzfahrzeuge GmbH v. Dana
Corp., 344 F.3d 1336, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (granting en banc review).
54 L.A. Gear, 988 F.2d at 1126, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1919.
55 Id.; Fromson v. W. Litho Plate and Supply Co., 853 F.2d 1568, 1572-73, 7 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1606, 1610-11 (Fed. Cir. 1988); Kloster Speedsteel, 793 F.2d at 1580, 230 U.S.P.Q. at 91. But see
Knorr-Bremse, 344 F.3d 1336, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d 1383.
56 Fromson, 853 F.2d at 1572-73, 7 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1611; Kloster Speedsteel, 793 F.2d at 1580, 230
U.S.P.Q.2d at 91. But see Knorr-Bremse, 344 F.3d 1336, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d 1383. Note that the two
inferences are quite distinct. For example, if the trier of fact makes the former inference, the dam-
age might be mitigated by pointing to some other form of due care. However, if the latter infer-
ence is made, it might theoretically outweigh any other form of due care taken. Regardless of
which inference is invoked, however it is clear that one advantage of invoking the defense is
avoiding either of these negative inferences.
57 See generally Jared S. Goff, Comment, The Unpredictable Scope of the Waiver Resulting from the
Advice-of-Counsel Defense to Willful Patent Infringement, 1998 BYU L. REv. 213.
58 Id.
59 See United States v. Ziegler Bolt & Parts Co., 111 F.3d 878, 883 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
60 Thayer & Brown, supra note 52.
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C. Exclusionary rules
Exclusionary rules, including both the attorney-client privilege and the work-
product doctrine, have been criticized practically since their inception.6 1 Neverthe-
less, Congress has directed federal courts to develop a federal common law to gov-
ern attorney-client privilege as it applies to issues arising under federal law, which
includes patent law; 62 the work-product immunity doctrine has been codified by
Congress; 63 and the Supreme Court has sanctioned both the attorney-client privilege
and the work-product immunity doctrine.64 Because of the continued vitality of
these exclusionary rules and their relationship to the advice-of-counsel defense, it is
important to understand the details of both the attorney-client privilege and the
work-product immunity doctrine.
1. The attorney-client privilege
65
The attorney-client privilege is a time-honored common-law doctrine that
protects the confidentiality of communications between attorneys and their cli-
ents.66 "Its purpose is to encourage full and frank communication between attor-
neys and their clients and thereby promote broader public interests in the obser-
vance of law and administration of justice., 67 The privilege encourages clients to
disclose all information to their attorneys, and attorneys to give unrestrained pro-
fessional advice to their clients.68 The common goal is to enable attorneys to carry
out the professional mission of effective representation.
69
61 See e.g., 5 JEREMY BENTHAM, THE RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE 302-12 (Garland Pub. 1978)
(arguing that the attorney-client privilege only benefits the guilty and therefore encourages law-
lessness). See generally Daniel R. Fischel, Lawyers and Confidentiality, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 3
(1998) ("The legal profession, not clients or society as a whole, is the primary beneficiary of con-
fidentiality rules."); Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Legal Advice About Information to Present
in Litigation: Its Effects and Social Desirability, 102 HARV. L. REV. 567 (1989) (questioning the
need for the attorney-client privilege and other rules of confidentiality because the rules further
the unfounded assumption that legal advice tends to promote socially desirable behavior).
62 See FED. R. EVID. 501; Dragseth, supra note 4, at 179.
63 See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3).
64 See, e.g., Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981).
65 See generally Go, supra note 51 (analyzing the attorney-client privilege as it relates to patent at-
torneys).
66 Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 389.
67 Id.
68 Id. However, while a per se privilege applies to confidential communications made by clients to
their attorneys for the purpose of obtaining legal advice, "[w]hether the privilege protects the legal
advice given or other communications from the attorney to the client depends on circumstance."
Am. Standard, Inc. v. Pfizer Inc., 828 F.2d 734, 745, 3 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1817, 1824 (Fed. Cir.
1987) (emphasis added).
69 Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 389.
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For various reasons, courts originally did not extend the attorney-client privi-
lege to patent attorneys or others working on patent issues. 70 However, the Su-
preme Court in 1963 recognized that patent agents must be treated as attorneys un-
der state law.71 Thus, patent prosecutors and the drafters of patent opinion letters
deserve the same attorney-client privilege afforded other attorneys under state law.
Congress has directed federal courts to develop federal common law to govern at-
torney-client privilege,72 and the Federal Circuit has extended to patent attorneys
the same general privilege requirements applied to other attorneys.73
Just as in every other legal practice area, when a client and an attorney 74 dis-
cuss patent-related legal issues, the attorney-client privilege belongs to the client,75
and the client may either expressly or inadvertently waive the privilege.76 Regard-
less of how the attorney-client privilege is waived, after waiver occurs, a court must
then determine the scope of the waiver.
2. The work-product immunity doctrine
In 1947 the Supreme Court first recognized the work-product immunity doc-
trine in the case of Hickman v. Taylor,77 which was later codified in Federal Rule of
70 See, e.g., United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357, 85 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 5. (D.
Mass. 1950) (finding attorney-client privilege did not apply to patent attorneys because they were
not acting as attorneys in the course of their employment); Zenith Radio Corp. v. Radio Corp. of
Am., 121 F. Supp. 792, 794, 101 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 316, 318 (D. Del. 1954) (finding that patent at-
torneys do not act as lawyers when working with technical subjects).
71 See Sperry v. Florida ex rel. Florida Bar, 373 U.S. 379, 137 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 578 (1963).
72 See FED. R. EvID. 501; Dragseth, supra note 4, at 179-80.
73 See, e.g., Am. Standard, 828 F.2d at 745, 3 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1824-25.
74 The privilege actually extends to patent agents as well. See generally Sperry, 373 U.S. at 383-84,
137 U.S.P.Q.2d at 579-80.
75 The client owns the attorney-client privilege; therefore only the client or an authorized agent or
attorney of the client may waive the privilege. CHARLES TILFORD MCCORMICK, MCCORMICK ON
EVIDENCE §§ 92-93 (5th ed. 1999). In the corporate setting, the board of directors ultimately re-
tains discretion to make waiver decisions. Id. § 93.
See, e.g., Winbond Elecs. Corp. v. ITC, 262 F.3d 1363, 1376, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1029, 1038
(Fed. Cir. 2001) (reaffirming holding that a patentee's inadvertent waiver of attorney-client privi-
lege in a patent infringement suit is a general waiver "for all purposes"); Greene, Tweed of Dela-
ware, Inc. v. Dupont Dow Elastomers, L.L.C., 202 F.R.D. 418, 420 (E.D. Pa. 2001) (parties
agreed that advice-of-counsel defense waived attorney-client privilege).
7 329 U.S. 495 (1947). The question presented to the Court in Hickman was whether the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, as then-existed, authorized a party to "inquire into materials collected by
an adverse party's counsel in the course of preparation for possible litigation." Id. at 505. After
dismissing the applicability of the attorney-client privilege to these types of materials (Id. at 508),
the Court read an implicit requirement into the rules that, to compel disclosure of work product,
the party seeking disclosure bears the burden of showing either the necessity of disclosure or the
hardship or injustice of nondisclosure. Id. at 509-12.
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Civil Procedure 26(b)(3). 78  While work product includes tangible and intangible
information, legal theories, and strategy prepared by attorneys in anticipation of
litigation, 79 the statute only covers tangible work product. 80 Tangible work product
includes "memoranda, briefs, communications and other writings prepared by
counsel for his own use in prosecuting his client's case." 81 To compel disclosure of
tangible work product, a showing must be made "that the party seeking discovery
has substantial need of the materials in the preparation of the party's case and that
the party is unable without undue hardship to obtain the substantial equivalent of
the materials by other means. 82
Interrelated functional arguments underlie the work-product immunity doc-
trine. Considering the professional obligations of lawyers, the Supreme Court
noted that:
it is essential that a lawyer work with a certain degree of privacy, free from unnecessary
intrusion by opposing parties and their counsel. Proper preparation of a client's case
demands that he assemble information, sift what he considers to be the relevant from the
irrelevant facts, prepare his legal theories and plan his strategy without undue and need-
less interference.
8 3
The practical result of not protecting work product would be that "much of what is
now put down in writing would remain unwritten." 84 Such a result would be ineffi-
cient and unfair. 85 Furthermore, "[t]he effect on the legal profession would be de-
78 The relevant portion of the current version of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(3) provides
that:
Subject to the provisions of subdivision (b)(4) of this rule [concerning expert witnesses], a party
may obtain discovery of documents and tangible things otherwise discoverable under subdivision
(b)(1) of this rule [concerning relevance and privilege] and prepared in anticipation of litigation or
for trial by or for another party or by or for that other party's representative (including the other
party's attorney, consultant, surety, indemnitor, insurer, or agent) only upon a showing that the
party seeking discovery has substantial need of the materials in the preparation of the party's case
and that the party is unable without undue hardship to obtain the substantial equivalent of the mate-
rials by other means. In ordering discovery of such materials when the required showing has been
made, the court shall protect against disclosure of the mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or
legal theories of an attorney or other representative of a party concerning the litigation.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3).
79 See id.; Hickman, 329 U.S. at 511.
80 See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(3).
81 Hickman, 329 U.S. at 508.
82 FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3).
83 Hickman, 329 U.S. at 510-11.
84 Id. at 511.
85 id.
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moralizing" while the interests of clients and justice itself "would be poorly
served. 86
Despite the strong language used by the Supreme Court to support work-
product immunity, the doctrine is not unbounded.
Where relevant and non-privileged facts remain hidden in an attorney's file and where
production of those facts is essential to the preparation of one's case, discovery may
properly be had. Such written statements and documents might, under certain circum-
stances, be admissible in evidence or give clues as to the existence or location of rele-
vant facts. Or they might be useful for purposes of impeachment or corroboration.
87
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has predicted that situations justifying pro-
duction of work product will be "rare. 88 Even when disclosure is required under
the rule, a court "shall protect against disclosure of the mental impressions, conclu-
sions, opinions, or legal theories of an attorney or other representative of a party
concerning the litigation."
89
The Federal Circuit recognizes the work-product immunity doctrine. 90
II1. The Disputed Issue: Scope of Waiver After
Asserting the Advice-of-Counsel Defense
A. Possible scopes of waiver: an overview
Finally, the question presents itself: to what extent does asserting the advice-
of-counsel defense to a charge of willful infringement waive attorney-client privi-
lege and work-product immunity? 91 One can imagine many possible answers to
this question. Before reviewing district court decisions on the issue or attempting
to resolve the issue in light of the principles behind the exclusionary rules and pat-
ent laws, consider the range of possibilities presented to the decision-maker.
86 Id.
87 id.
88 Id. at 513.
89 FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3).
90 C( Winbond Elecs., 262 F.3d 1363, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d 1029 (affirming trial judge's determination of
the temporal scope of the waiver of work-product protection).
91 Versions of this question have arisen in numerous recent analyses of various issues related to pat-
ent litigation. See, e.g., William M. Atkinson et al., Opinions of Counsel: Why, When and How
To, 715 PLUPAT. 289 (2002); Madeline F. Baer et al., Willful Patent Infringement, 721 PLIIPAT.
639 (2002); Sharon A. Israel & Jason W. Cook, Preparing Patent Invalidity Opinions, 715
PLUPAT. 169 (2002); Edward G. Poplawski, Effective Preparation of Patent-Related Exculpatory
Legal Opinions, 715 PLUPAT. 387 (2002); Stephen A. Soffen & J. Anthony Lovensheimer, Dis-
covery and Use of Opinions in Litigation, 667 PLI/PAT. 507 (2001); Sundeen, supra note 10;
Thayer & Brown, supra note 52; Vicki S. Veenker, Litigating the Willfulness Charge, 721
PLI/PAT. 619 (2002).
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First, consider the attorney-client privilege. Various scopes of waiver can be
envisioned. The advise-of-counsel defense might only waive the privilege with re-
spect to the opinion letter, which is simply legal advice communicated from the at-
torney to the client. Or the defense might waive communications in which the at-
torney expresses or otherwise casts doubt upon the substance of the opinion. A
slightly broader interpretation would extend the waiver to any communications be-
tween the attorney and the client regarding the same subject matter as the opinion,
e.g. validity. An even broader interpretation would require disclosure of communi-
cations regarding all subjects related to patent law, including validity, enforceabil-
ity, and infringement, regardless of whether the opinion letter relied upon addresses
only a subset of subjects. Lastly, the broadest waiver would make available all
communications between the attorney and the client.
Next, consider work-product immunity. Various scopes of waiver can be en-
visioned here as well. The advice-of-counsel defense might make available work
product that casts doubt on the opinion, work product that directly relates to the
opinion, work product concerning the same subject matter as the opinion (for ex-
ample validity) or work product related to any subject, including validity, enforce-
ability, and infringement. Or the waiver might extend to all work product produced
by the attorney in developing the opinion. Also, the waiver might only apply to
work product that includes facts (fact work product), or it might extend to the men-
tal impressions of the attorney (opinion work product).
Consider two complicating questions. First, what is the temporal scope of the
waiver? Waiver might begin as soon as a patent issues or when a party is put on
notice of potential infringement. Waiver might end at the time the case was filed
and trial counsel was hired. Alternately, the time period might be linked to the al-
legation of willfulness.
Second, to whom does the waiver apply? The waiver might be limited and
apply only to the attorney providing the opinion of counsel. Perhaps the waiver
might be extended to apply to any attorney the client contacts in regard to the pat-
ent. A significant issue is whether trial attorneys should be treated differently than
other attorneys. On one hand, trial attorneys might be provided more protection by
applying a narrower waiver. Greater protection might reflect the belief that confi-
dential communication is at the heart of the adversary system. On the other hand,
trial attorneys might be provided less protection by applying a broader waiver.
Less protection might encourage parties not to use trial counsel to render opinions.
Figure 1 summarizes these possibilities.
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Figure 1: Possible scopes of attorney-
client privilege and work-product immunity waivers.
Attorney-client privilege Work-product doctrine
(applied to opinion counsel, (applied to opinion counsel,
trial counsel or all attorneys trial counsel or all attorneys
aconsed by liett y contacted by client; fact or
contacted by client) opinion work product)
Narrowest No waiver of any No waiver of any work product
communiction
Waiver of opinion letter only Waiver of opinion letter only
Waiver of communications Waiver of work product casting
casting doubt on opinion doubt on opinion
Waiver of communications Waiver of work product directly
directly related to opinion of related to opinion of counsel
counsel
Waiver of communications on Waiver of work product on
same subject matter as opin- same subject matter as opinion
ion of counsel, e.g. validity of counsel, e.g. validity
Waiver of communications on Waiver of work product on all
all subjects, i.e. validity, en- subjects, i.e. validity, enforce-
I forceability, infringement ability, infringement
Broadest Waiver of all communications Waiver of all work product
B. Deconstructing the complexity of waiver determinations
Out of the spectrum of imaginable possibilities just outlined, consider the
scope of waiver trial courts have imposed when alleged infringers invoke the ad-
vise-of-counsel defense. In light of the discretion afforded trial judges in this area,
it is not surprising that the case law also presents a spectrum of answers to this
question. To better understand the various answers courts have given, the complex
issues that courts must consider when determining the scope of waiver have been
divided into four main topics: exclusionary rules, subject matter, residual substan-
tive issues including temporal scope and to whom the waiver applies, and proce-
dural issues.
1. Exclusionary rules
Cases addressing exclusionary rules in the waiver context can be divided into
three general categories based on which of the three most common approaches a
particular court adopts.
[VOL. 12:319
Wasting Resources: Reinventing the Scope of Waiver
i) Communications waiver
One series of cases holds that when an opinion of counsel is presented to re-
but an allegation of willfulness, attorney-client privilege and work-product immu-
nity are waived only with respect to documents communicated to the client.92
Thus, while communications between the client and the opinion counsel are
waived, work-product immunity continues to shield documents not communicated
to the client. For purposes of this article, this scope of waiver will be called the
"communications waiver." Essentially, the communications waiver is limited to
waiver of attorney-client privilege.
A decision epitomizing the approach resulting in the communications waiver
is Thorn EMI North America, Inc. v. Micron Technology, Inc.93 In Thorn, a magis-
trate judge first analyzed Federal Circuit precedent and concluded that willful pat-
ent infringement is ultimately a question of the infringer's state of mind.94 The
court then cited the traditionally narrow scope of work product waivers under Fed-
eral Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(3). 95 Combining these two factors, the court re-
jected the argument that the basis and actual competence of an opinion of counsel
are of consequence to a willfulness inquiry.96 Thus, the judge resolved the issue of
what type of inquiry is appropriate by adopting the subjective approach to analyz-
ing willfulness. The court only required disclosure of documents communicated
between the client and the attorney, and refused to adopt a broader scope of waiver
that would have compelled disclosure of non-communicated work product. The
court reasoned that the mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, and legal theo-
ries of opinion counsel are not probative of the state of mind of the infringer unless
they are communicated to the client.
97
Because the communications waiver purports to reflect Federal Circuit prece-
dent regarding willfulness, it is not surprising that some patent owners agree to the
92 See BASF AG v. Reilly Indus., Inc., 283 F. Supp. 2d 1000, 1008 (S.D. Ind. 2003); Chimie v. PPG
Indus., Inc., 218 F.R.D. 416, 420 (D. Del. 2003); Eco Mfg., 2003 WL 1888988, at *8 (trademark
case); Michlin v. Canon, Inc., 208 F.R.D. 172 (E.D. Mich. 2002); Motorola, Inc. v. Vosi Techs.,
Inc., No. 01-C4182, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15655 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 22, 2002); Dentsply Int'l, Inc.
v. Great White, Inc., 132 F. Supp. 2d 310 (M.D. Pa. 2000); Med. Techs., Inc. v. AGA Med. Corp.,
135 F. Supp. 2d 212 (D. Mass. 2000); Nitinol Carl Zeiss Jena GMBH v. Bio-Rad Labs. Inc., No.
98 CIV. 8012 (RCC)(DFE), 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10044 (S.D.N.Y. July 19, 2000); Thermos
Co. v. Starbucks Corp., No. 96-C3833, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17753 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 4, 1998);
Steelcase Inc. v. Haworth, Inc., 954 F. Supp. 1195, 43 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1041 (W.D. Mich.
1997); Thorn EMI N. Am., Inc. v. Micron Tech., Inc., 837 F. Supp. 616, 29 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1872 (D. Del. 1993).
93 837 F. Supp. 616, 29 U.S.P.Q.2d 1872.
94 Id. at 620-21, 29 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1875.
" Id. at 621, 29 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1875-76.
96 Id. at 622, 29 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1876.
97 id.
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communications waiver. 98 However, some judges have criticized its narrowness.
One critique argues that the waiver issue should be framed in terms of discoverabil-
ity, which implies broad disclosure, and not admissibility, which implies strict pro-
tection. Thus, a district judge has reasoned that
focusing solely on whether evidence was clearly communicated by the attorney to the
client can obscure the fact that evidence which does not facially reflect communication
to the client may nonetheless be relevant to showing the client's state of mind. This is
so simply because negative evidence contained in the attorney's files raises the reason-
able circumstantial inference that the client was somehow appraised of the negative
opinions.
99
This criticism focuses the inquiry on the work product as it may possibly reflect the
state of mind of the accused willful infringer. However, notice that the judge did
not say that work product is discoverable because it may lead to admissible evi-
dence. Instead, the judge left open the prospect that work product is admissible in
and of itself. Other judges invoke similar criticisms and, embracing a legal realist
perspective, push the argument closer to the conclusion that the state of mind of the
attorney is not only relevant, but admissible:
Certainly it would not be rational to assume that everything in counsel's files reached
the client, or that counsel communicated to the client all of what he or she really
thought, but it would be comparably irrational to assume that there could be no relation-
ship between what counsel really thought (as reflected in her private papers) and what
she in fact communicated to her client. In this important sense, evidence about what
really was in the lawyer's mind could be quite relevant to the issue of what really was in
the client's mind. 100
Both criticisms are grounded in a sense of practicality. That is, practically
speaking, what is in the attorney's mind may be the same thing as what is in the cli-
ent's mind. Thus, while proclaiming discoverability to be the goal, the courts actu-
ally move the line closer to admissibility.
ii) Complete waiver
Most critiques of the first solution form a second line of cases that treats in-
vocation of the advice-of-counsel defense as a waiver of both attorney-client privi-
lege and work-product immunity, regardless of whether the attorney communicates
the documents to the client.'0 ' These courts go so far as to require disclosure of
98 See, e.g., Motorola, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15655, at *5-6 ("Vosi has agreed to the second limita-
tion proposed by Motorola: that any waiver be limited to matters that were actually communicated
to Motorola, and should not include counsel's mental impressions, thought processes, and work
product that were not communicated to Motorola.").
99 Dunhall Pharm., Inc. v. Discus Dental, Inc., 994 F. Supp. 1202, 1205, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1365,
1368 (C.D. Cal. 1997).
10o Chiron Corp. v. Genentech, Inc., 179 F. Supp. 2d 1182, 1189 (E.D. Cal. 2001).
101 See Aspex Eyewear, Inc. v. E'lite Optik, Inc., 276 F. Supp. 2d 1084 (D. Nev. 2003); KW Muth
Co. v. Bing-Lear Mfg. Group, 219 F.R.D. 554 (E.D. Mich. 2003); Verizon California Inc. v.
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work product that includes the mental impressions of opinion counsel. 10 2 For pur-
poses of this article, this scope of waiver will be called the "complete waiver."
A decision representative of an early approach advocating complete waiver is
Mushroom Associates v. Monterey Mushrooms, Inc.103 In Mushroom, a magistrate
judge began by recognizing that fairness should prevent a party from disclosing
self-serving documents while withholding potentially damaging documents. 104 Fur-
thermore, the court, in considering Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(3), found
a "substantial need exists for the work product" where "the discovering party can-
not obtain substantially equivalent materials because the specific work product is
directly at issue."'10 5 Waiver therefore extended to fact work product under Rule
26(b)(3). However, the court did not stop there. Ruling that "what the attorney
thought about infringement bears directly on the defendants' advice of counsel de-
fense," the court found the need for documents including opinion counsel's mental
impressions to be compelling, requiring its disclosure despite Rule 26(b)(3). 10 6
Thus, the principle of fairness guided the court to extend the waiver to documents
otherwise protected by both attorney-client privilege and work-product immunity,
regardless of the alleged willful infringer's knowledge of the documents, and in-
cluding opinion work product.
However, early decisions waiving all work-product immunity were criticized
as ignoring Federal Circuit law: "[r]emarkably, these cases do not attempt to divine
from Federal Circuit authority any controlling principle grounded in substantive
patent law. In fact, these cases do not cite Federal Circuit authority at all, but rely
upon district court opinions in patent cases or in general civil litigation.' 1 7 The
general thrust of the complaints is that these cases improperly consider the attor-
ney's state of mind to be relevant or even "paramount."' 0 8 Decisions invoking
these critiques adopted the communications waiver.
Ronald A. Katz Technology Licensing, L.P., 266 F. Supp. 2d 1144 (C.D. Cal. 2003); Novartis
Pharm. Corp. v. Eon Labs Mfg., Inc., 206 F.R.D. 396 (D. Del. 2002); Chiron, 179 F. Supp. 2d
1182; Greene, Tweed of Delaware, 202 F.R.D. 418; Dunhall Pharm, 994 F. Supp. 1202, 46
U.S.P.Q.2d 1365; Mushroom Assocs. v. Monterey Mushrooms, Inc., 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1767
(N.D. Cal. 1992); RCA Corp. v. Data Gen. Corp., No. 84-270-JJF, 1986 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23244
(D. Del. July 2, 1986); cf Handgards, Inc. v. Johnson & Johnson, 413 F. Supp. 926, 192 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 316 (N.D. Cal. 1976).
102 See, e.g., Mushroom Assocs., 24 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1771 ("Discovery of mental impression work






107 Steelcase, 954 F. Supp. at 1199, 43 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1044.
108 Id.
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Responding to these criticisms, more recent cases adopting the complete
waiver connect the attorney's work product and state of mind to the state of mind of
the client. These arguments, which are noted above, emphasize practicality.
Again, practically speaking, the state of mind of patent counsel more often than not
will reflect the state of mind of the client.
Surprisingly, recent court decisions invoking the complete waiver do not ar-
ticulate the most satisfactory justification for the complete waiver. Unquestion-
ingly accepting the premise that the state of mind of opinion counsel is not at issue
in a willfulness determination, judges seeking to invoke the complete waiver resign
themselves to connect the work product of opinion counsel to the state of mind of
the alleged willful infringer. These judges do not recognize that while the state of
mind of opinion counsel may not be at issue in a willfulness determination per se, it
seems logical that the state of mind of opinion counsel is put at issue by the invoca-
tion of the advice-of-counsel defense to an allegation of willfulness. In short, the
question is whether the state of mind of opinion counsel is put at issue by the pres-
entation of the opinion letter itself. To support the complete waiver, however, it is
not necessary to go that far. Having put the opinion letter at issue, which in reality
is simply one piece of opinion work product, the burden would appear to be on al-
leged willful infringers to justify why every other piece of opinion work product
should not also be put at issue. Of course, the alleged willful infringer may argue
that the state of mind of the attorney is irrelevent. Regardless, in this light, waiver
of opinion work product is more than plausible. Indeed, this logic seems to have
provided the basis for the Mushroom decision, perhaps explaining why that deci-
sion fails to cite Federal Circuit law.
However, another argument recently put forward to support the complete
waiver must be recognized and rejected. In Novartis Pharmaceuticals Corp. v. Eon
Labs Manufacturing, Inc.,109 a district judge opined that "the starting point for the
analysis is the infringer [sic] decision to waive the attorney-client privilege." Just
two sentences after announcing this "starting point," however, the court quickly
jumped to the conclusion that, where the advice-of-counsel defense is asserted, a
complete waiver attaches.'1 10 Besides being circular, this reasoning ignores both the
dilemma presented to accused willful infringers by the choice of whether to assert
the defense in the first place, and then the uncertainty surrounding the scope of
waiver itself.
A better understanding of the dilemma and uncertainty confronting alleged
willful infringers is found in Motorola, Inc. v. Vosi Technologies, Inc."' In Mo-
torola, a district judge determined that an accused willful infringer should be given
109 206 F.R.D. 396, 398 (D. Del. 2002).
110 Id.
".. 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15655.
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the opportunity to make an informed decision whether to invoke the advise-of-
counsel defense. 1 2 The court ruled that an alleged willful infringer's motion for a
protective order "is an appropriate procedure; it permits a party to make a fully-
informed and intelligent decision whether to rely on advice of counsel with full
knowledge of the consequences of the decision."'" 13 Thus, while the argument that
the state of mind of opinion counsel often coincides with the state of mind of the
client is compelling and therefore carries much weight, the argument that an alleged
willful infringer's decision to invoke the attorney-client defense determines the ex-
tent of the waiver itself is nonsensical and should be rejected." 4
iii) Communications/fact work-product waiver
Although not yet recognized in academic literature or in decisions, a third ap-
proach suggested by a few cases is that the advice-of-counsel defense waives attor-
ney-client privilege and work-product immunity with respect to documents com-
municated to the client as well as fact work-product immunity, regardless of
whether the attorney communicates the fact work product to the client. 1 5 On the
one hand, this waiver is broader than the communications waiver because fact work
product not communicated to the client is discoverable. On the other hand, this
waiver is narrower than the complete waiver because opinion work product not
communicated to the client is not discoverable. Therefore, this most recent devel-
opment in the case law might be seen as a compromise position. For the purposes
of this note, this scope of waiver, for lack of a better name, will be called "commu-
nications/fact work-product waiver."
Cordis Corp. v. SciMed Life Systems, Inc.' 6 took the first step toward the
communications/fact-work product waiver. In Cordis, a patent owner sought dis-
closure of the results of commissioned experiments that the alleged willful infringer
relied upon in forming an opinion of counsel. 1 7 A magistrate judge first criticized
112 Id. at *3.
113 Id.
114 On the other hand, one situation in which the complete waiver appears justified beyond reasonable
objection involves oral opinions. Two recent cases involving oral opinions ended in the complete
waiver. See KWMuth, 219 F.R.D. 554; Aspex, 276 F. Supp. 2d 1084.
115 D.O.T. Connectors, Inc. v. J.B. Nottingham & Co., No. 4:99cv311-WS, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
735 (N.D. Fla. Jan. 22, 2001); Cordis Corp. v. SciMed Life Sys., Inc., 980 F. Supp. 1030 (D.
Minn. 1997). Two recent opinions, one determining the scope of waiver as applied to disclosure of
an opinion regarding trademark infringement, recognize this third approach. See Eco Mfg., 2003
WL 1888988, at *8 (trademark case); KWMuth, 219 F.R.D. at 573 (patent case)
116 Cordis, 980 F. Supp. 1030.
117 Id. at 1033.
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the impracticality of conducting a "four-corners" review of the opinion of coun-
sel. 18 The court next addressed fact work-product immunity:
[W]e find no rational basis to conclude that, when patent counsel's opinion is premised
upon assumed, or asserted facts, that the factual premises are immune from appropriate
inquiry . . . To suggest, as the [alleged willful infringer] does here, that the [patent
owner] must accept the validity of those experimental results for, to disclose the same
would breach the [alleged willful infringer]'s legal privileges, is farcical. We can accept
that an inventor, who seeks legal counsel so as to exercise due care in respecting the
patent rights of a competitor, might not be fully qualified, in the ordinary course of
events, to appraise the validity of his patent attorney's legal reasoning, but we cannot
accept that the inventor would be similarly unqualified to assess the validity of the fac-
tual premises upon which his patent counsel has framed his legal opinion, or that he
would be permitted carte blanche to accept any factual predicate without question ....
[W]e believe that a rigorous examination of the factual predicates for an opinion of pat-
ent counsel, in defense of a claim of willfulness, is essential. To conclude otherwise,
would be to effectively insulate the potential infringer from increased damages. 1
9
The court might have seemingly achieved the same result, disclosure of the
experimental results, by simply adopting the communications waiver. However,
the court rejected the communications waiver, stating that "the operative factor is
not whether the underlying factual information had been shared with the [alleged
willful infringer], but whether that information either served, or should have served,
as a factual predicate for counsel's opinion . .,, 120 Nevertheless, this decision
might be explainable. There is reason to believe that the communications waiver
would not have exposed the experimental results because they may have been
shielded from the client, perhaps for the express purpose of avoiding disclosure.
The court signaled as much when it noted its "doubt that the law would intend,
however inadvertently, to reward incompetence, or willful artifice, by insulating
such opinions from searching scrutiny.
12 1
A later case integrating the communications waiver with the waiver imple-
mented in Cordis, thereby fully adopting the communications/fact work-product
waiver, is D.O.T. Connectors, Inc. v. JB. Nottingham & Co. 122 In D.O.T. Connec-
tors, a magistrate judge concluded that "the waiver extends to any evidence con-
sidered by the attorney who gave the opinion (fact work product), whether or not it
was communicated to [the alleged willful infringer], but does not extend to legal
118 id.
119 Id.
120 Id. at 1034.
121 Id. at 1034 n.1 (emphasis added).
122 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 739 (granting defendant's motion to compel).
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research or other opinion work product unless such opinion work product was com-
municated to [the alleged willful infringer]. 123
The communications/fact work-product waiver may be a neatly packaged
compromise between the entrenched positions of the communications waiver and
the complete waiver. In fact, this approach may more accurately track the work-
product doctrine, at least as the doctrine is articulated in Rule 26(b)(3). On the one
hand, a substantial need is apparent if it can be proven that the facts were known to
the alleged willful infringer, since the state of mind of the party is at issue. Even if
the facts are willfully shielded from the alleged willful infringer, this shielding
should raise serious doubts about the reasonableness of that party's reliance on any
resulting opinion. On the other hand, proving undue hardship might be difficult be-
cause substantially equivalent facts might be obtainable through the traditional dis-
covery process. Still, if we assume that in some circumstances undue hardship may
be proven and thus fact work-product immunity is waived, opinion work product
should nevertheless be shielded according to Rule 26(b)(3).
The Supreme Court expressly recognized that "a far stronger showing of ne-
cessity and unavailability by other means" is required before opinion work product
may be ordered. 124 Whether that "far stronger showing" is met when the opinion-
of-counsel defense is asserted, of course, is debatable. As to fact work product, the
Federal Circuit has instructed that a "counsel's opinion must be premised upon the
best information known to the defendant."1 25 Such an affirmative instruction may
convert the desire for fact work product into a necessity to determine compliance
with this directive.
However, at least one district court explicitly rejected the argument that non-
communicated fact work product should be disclosed. 126 In Nitinol Medical Tech-
nologies, Inc. v. AGA Medical Corp.,27 a patent owner did not seek opinion work
product, but only documents related to the factual basis of the opinion. 128 In reject-
ing a motion to compel, the court held that "[u]nless it can be established that the
defendant knew of the factual basis for counsel's opinions, such work product
should not have to be produced."'
2 9
123 Id. at *10.
124 Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 401-02.
125 Comark Comms., Inc. v. Harris Corp., 156 F.3d 1182, 1191, 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1001, 1009
(Fed. Cir. 1998).
126 Of course, every court adopting the communications waiver implicitly rejects disclosure of fact
work product.
127 135 F. Supp. 2d 212 (D. Mass. 2000).
128 Id. at 213.
129 Id. at 218.
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2. Subject matter
i) Extending waiver based on subject matter
Most courts, regardless of which approach to the exclusionary rules they
adopt, further limit any waiver to the subject matter of the opinion. However, the
subject matter of the opinion letter is oftentimes unclear. Consider the frequent
topics addressed by opinions of counsel: invalidity, unenforceability, and nonin-
fringement. On the one hand, sometimes presenters of opinions of counsel admit to
waiving privilege and immunity as to all these topics. 130 On the other hand, some-
times patent owners limit discovery requests to the specific topic addressed by the
opinion letter.13 1 Both of these situations are easy. But does an opinion that ad-
dresses only one of these topics require disclosure of communications or work
product concerning the others?
District judges are not in agreement as to the scope of subject matter waived.
Some courts restrict the breadth of waiver. "Subject matter waiver does not mean
all opinions as to all possible defenses, but does mean all opinions of the specific
issue of advice asserted as a defense to willfulness, be it infringement, validity, en-
forcement, or a combination."' 32 Other courts require more expansive disclosure.
For example, in Motorola, the district court recognized that claim construction may
tie multiple topics together:
It is conceivable that [the alleged willful infringer] could have received an opinion of
invalidity that was based on a very broad construction of the claims, while also receiv-
ing an opinion of non-infringement that was based on a narrower construction. In that
hypothetical situation, knowledge of the narrower construction could cast doubt on the
premise of the opinion of invalidity and thus could bear on whether it was reasonable for
[the alleged willful infringer] to rely on that opinion.' 33
This argument provides a nice segue into the second issue surrounding subject mat-
ter: gatekeeping.
ii) Gatekeeping: waiver of communications or documents that
cast doubt on the opinion
In Thermos Co. v. Starbucks Corp.,' 34 a district judge determined that, with
respect to opinion counsel, the communications waiver applied. 135 Waiver also ex-
tended to any other communications from any other attorneys, including trial coun-
130 See, e.g., ACLARA Biosciences, Inc. v. Caliper Techs. Corp., No. C99-1968 CRB (JCS), 2000
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10585, at *44 (N.D. Cal. Jun. 16, 2000).
131 See, e.g., Mushroom Assocs., 24 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1768 n.1.
132 Akeva L.L.C. v. Mizuno Corp., 243 F. Supp. 2d 418, 422 (M.D.N.C. 2003).
133 Motorola, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15655, at *4-5 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 22, 2002).
114 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17753.
'35 Id. at *12.
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sel, involving the subject matter discussed in the opinion letter.136 However, the
judge limited this waiver only to require disclosure of any communications from
trial counsel to the infringer "containing 'potentially damaging information' or 'ex-
pressing grave reservations respecting the opinion letter." 10 3
7
Similarly, in Micron Separations, Inc. v. Pall Corp., 138 a magistrate judge de-
termined that the work-product privilege was waived only with respect to opinion
work product inconsistent with or casting doubt upon the opinion letter:
Surely the waiver extends to any documents communicated to [the alleged willful in-
fringer] by present trial counsel before suit was filed which contain potentially damag-
ing information and/or express grave reservations respecting the opinion letter. But I
decline to apply the waiver to documents containing the opinion work product of present
trial counsel which is solely consistent with the opinion letter and does not in any way
cast any doubt on the validity of the opinions expressed or the bases for those opin-
ions. '39
These cases create a gatekeeping function that the alleged willful infringer is al-
lowed to control.
These solutions are easily criticized. They create "an unworkable limitation
as it requires counsel for defendant to make a subjective judgment as to the proba-
tive weight of the second opinion."'' 40 Obviously, the reality is that an attorney will
probably resolve close issues in the client's favor, either due to bias or professional




i) Who does waiver apply to?
An obvious but often overlooked issue is determining the attorneys to whom
the waiver applies. The facts of most cases only present the issue of waiver as it
136 Id. at *15-16.
137 Id. at *14 (quoting Micron Separations, Inc. v. Pall Corp., 159 F.R.D. 361, 365 (D. Mass. 1995)).
13' 159 F.R.D. 361.
139 Id. at 365 (internal quotations omitted).
140 DOT. Connectors, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 739, *8 n.3 (citing Dunhall Pharm., 994 F. Supp. at
1205, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1368).
141 However, resolving close matters in favor of a client may be completely appropriate. Cf. Ortho
Pharm., 959 F.2d at 945, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1126 ("A party is not guilty of ignoring patent rights
because it resolves a close question of infringement in its favor.").
142 See, e.g., Beneficial Franchise Co., Inc. v. Bank One, N.A., 205 F.R.D. 212 (N.D. Ill. 2001); see
also Lakewood Eng'g & Mfg. Co. v. Lasko Prods., Inc., No. 01 C 7867, 2003 WL 1220254, at
*10 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 14, 2003). Note that Lakewood presents a hybrid solution that invokes the
communications waiver with respect to opinion counsel and a gatekeeping-style complete waiver
with respect to trial counsel. Id.
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applies to opinion counsel. However, some cases involve opinion counsel who also
act as trial counsel, and vice versa. Still other cases present the question of whether
waiver should apply to other attorneys, for example, attorneys contacted by a client
in search of a favorable opinion.
One answer is to extend waiver to "all those counsel who rendered an opin-
ion. ,143 However, the appropriateness of this scope depends on how broadly or nar-
rowly "opinion" is defined. A definition that limits the scope of waiver to written
opinions would protect oral communications with attorneys who decline to produce
written opinions because, in their professional judgment, infringement of a valid
and enforceable patent is occurring or would occur. Obviously, this result does not
comport with the goals of deterring infringement. Thus, a broader definition of
"opinion" is seemingly more appropriate.
Answering the question of who the waiver applies to raises a second question:
whether one scope of waiver should apply equally to all counsel. If different
scopes apply to different folks, yet more questions are presented: how to determine
what scope is appropriate for each party and how to explain the relative difference.
A common scenario is that a court applies different scopes of waiver to opin-
ion counsel than to trial counsel. However, district courts are split on the issue of
which party deserves more protection. As noted above, in Thermos, a judge de-
cided that a narrower scope of waiver applied to trial counsel than to opinion coun-
sel.144 This decision is understandable, since protection of trial counsel's commu-
nications and work product seems to be the heart of the attorney-client and work-
product doctrine.
Nevertheless, just the opposite result is seen in other cases. More recently, in
Akeva L.L.C. v. Mizuno Corp.,45 a magistrate judge concluded that a broader
waiver applied to opinions prepared by trial counsel when compared to opinions
prepared by non-trial counsel. 146 This decision may reflect the ex ante incentives
on alleged willful infringers that the scope of waiver produces. On the one hand, a
narrower waiver for trial counsel would create an incentive for an alleged willful
infringer to seek an opinion from its trial counsel. On the other hand, a broader
waiver for trial counsel creates a disincentive to seek the opinion from trial counsel.
The court chose to create the disincentive for at least two reasons. First, the Federal
Circuit encourages parties to obtain opinions from independent attorneys. 147 Re-
143 Fonar Corp. v. Johnson & Johnson, 227 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 886, 888 (D. Mass. 1985).
144 Thermos, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17753, at *13 (citing Micron Separations, 159 F.R.D. at 365);
see also Douglas Press, Inc. v. Universal Mfg. Co., No. 01 C 2565, 2003 WL 21361731 (N.D. Ill.
June 11, 2003).
14" 243 F. Supp. 2d418.
146 Id. at 424.
141 Id. at 421.
(VOL. 12:319
Wasting Resources: Reinventing the Scope of Waiver
quiring broader disclosure in the case of opinions obtained from trial counsel, and
therefore encouraging alleged willful infringers to seek out an independent opinion,
does not undermine the Federal Circuit's stated preference. Second, if obtaining an
opinion from trial counsel better insulated communications and work product, the
system might be abused.148 Parties would have an incentive to seek opinions from
trial counsel for the express purpose of later hiding any sensitive documents that
might be created during the formation of the opinion letter.
149
Extending waiver to trial counsel should be limited to instances in which the
alleged willful infringer relies upon and presents an opinion letter produced by the
trial counsel. Consistent application of a broad waiver to trial counsel would ignore
the reality of litigation. Trial counsel, by definition, will give the alleged willful
infringer advice on the exact same subject or subjects discussed in the opinion let-
ter-validity, enforceability, and infringement-in preparing a case on the issue of
liability. Furthermore, trial counsel must evaluate any opinions obtained and advise
the client on the soundness of reliance on any opinion at trial.
ii) Temporal scope
Another issue about which some courts disagree is the temporal scope of
waiver. One end of the equation-when waiver attaches-is less debatable.
Waiver cannot apply until after a party receives notice or otherwise learns of a pat-
ent. Therefore, waiver probably cannot attach before a patent issues because no
patent exists to analyze in the form of an opinion. 50 Furthermore, waiver probably
should not apply to communications or work product divorced from the time period
of the alleged willful infringement. 51 Instead, waiver might be tied to the ap-
proximate time period in which the opinion was rendered.
152
The second issue-when waiver no longer applies-is more debatable. In
some cases, courts have limited waiver to the time before the lawsuit was filed.
153
Reminiscent of the desire to shield trial counsel from being required to disclose
communications and work product, this approach appears appealing at first. How-
148 Id. at 424.
149 Id.
15o Cf ACLARA Biosciences, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10585, at *41-42 ("[I]t is hard to see how letters
written two years before the [patent] issued can be essential (or even relevant) to a defense that fo-
cuses on the alleged infringer's conduct after it learns of the patent allegedly infringed.").
151 Cf Michlin v. Canon, Inc., 208 F.R.D. 172, 173 (E.D. Mich. 2002) ("It is difficult to understand
how there could be reliance on opinions prepared after the lawsuit for activities commenced prior
to the lawsuit. However this is the defense.").
152 See Fonar, 227 U.S.P.Q. at 887-88 (extending waiver to "all those counsel who rendered an opin-
ion... during approximately the same time period").
153 See, e.g., Micron Separations, 159 F.R.D. at 366; Carl Zeiss Jena GMBH v. Bio-Rad Labs. Inc.,
No. 98 CIV. 8012 (RCC)(DFE), 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10044, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. July 19, 2000).
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ever, the state of mind of the alleged willful infringer might be relevant even after
the case is filed, such as when a patent owner alleges continuing willful infringe-
ment up until the day of trial. Therefore, "[w]hile there is some authority that cuts
off the waiver at time of the filing of the action, the better authority requires that all
communications, both pre and post-complaint filing, should be disclosed." 154 The
same may be said of pre- and post-complaint work product, to the extent it is
waived.
4. Procedural protections
Procedural protections often provide substantive protection. The Federal Cir-
cuit has recognized two procedural wrinkles in the willfulness context that provide
alleged willful infringers with greater protection: bifurcated trials and in camera re-
view. Other useful procedures are separate hearings on the issues of waiver and
admissibility.
i) Bifurcated trials
Recognizing the difficult decision alleged willful infringers face when decid-
ing whether to invoke the advice-of-counsel defense, the Federal Circuit has sug-
gested that district court judges consider bifurcating jury trials. 15 5 The first trial
would cover liability and damages; the second trial, if necessary, would cover will-
fulness. 15 6 The decision of whether to invoke the advice-of-counsel defense could
therefore be postponed and would only be decided if necessary to disprove willful-
ness. Courts would not be pressed to answer the very question posed by this arti-
cle: what is the scope of waiver of attorney-client privilege and work-product im-
munity that results when, in response to an allegation of willful infringement, the
advice-of-counsel defense is asserted. Also, by postponing any discussion of the
opinion, waiver would not prejudice the alleged willful infringer during the liability
trial.
In theory, the idea of bifurcation sounds useful and appropriate. Neverthe-
less, in practice, institutional hurdles impede the use of bifurcation by trial courts. 
157
Increased cost appears to be the main complaint.1 58 "[M]any district judges find
[bifurcation] impractical, especially in jury cases, and also find it inconsistent with
154 Chiron, 179 F. Supp. 2d at 1188; see also Akeva, 243 F. Supp. 2d at 423 ("[W]aiver of attorney-
client privilege or work product protection covers all points of time, including up through trial.")
155 Quantum Corp. v. Tandon Corp., 940 F.2d 642, 644 (Fed. Cir. 1991) ("While our court has recog-
nized that refusal of a separate trial will not require reversal in every case involving attorney client
communications bearing on willfulness, we have suggested the advisability of separate trials in
appropriate cases.").
156 See id. at 643-44.
157 Akeva, 243 F. Supp. 2d, at 421 n.4.
158 Id.
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the [sic] rapid disposition of cases."' 159 Furthermore, despite "hav[ing] suggested
the advisability of separate trials in appropriate cases," the Federal Circuit would
probably review decisions not to bifurcate trials under a clearly erroneous standard
of review: "Similarly, an order refusing to bifurcate a trial is a routine discretionary
decision of the district court concerning trial management."
'1 60
District courts should reconsider and bifurcate trials for at least three reasons.
First, the decision to reject bifurcation does not necessarily save time or money. In
fact, the efficiency of not bifurcating a trial might only be determined through em-
pirical study. The cost of a willfulness trial will be incurred only if infringement is
found during the liability trial, but savings from not including the willfulness issue
in the liability trial will redound every time. Therefore the efficiency of bifurcation
depends upon the cost of a separate willfulness trial multiplied by its probable oc-
currence compared to the decreased cost of conducting a liability trial without will-
fulness issues. The costs the district courts should consider include not only costs
to the court, such as the delay caused by the need to sit a second jury, but also costs
to the parties, such as discovery costs. Note that a large cost that courts could avoid
is the subject of this article: the cost of reinventing the scope of waiver. Whether
bifurcation or non-bifurcation is more efficient, then, appears to be less than obvi-
ous.
Second, district court judges should consider whether bifurcating the trial
would better serve justice. Despite any instructions to the contrary, an alleged will-
ful infringer may appear quite culpable to a jury when there is evidence that he
sought the opinion of a patent attorney upon learning of a patent. Bifurcating the
trial would avoid confusing the jury and prejudicing the alleged willful infringer.
Third, as detailed in Part III, the decision to bifurcate the trial furthers the
possibility that the Federal Circuit will finally find jurisdiction to review a waiver
determination. Because of these reasons, efficiency, justice, and the possibility of
Federal Circuit review, trial judges should strongly consider bifurcating trials.
Even if the traditional form of bifurcation is not adopted, judges have discre-
tion to create workable alternatives. For example, a recent case suggests that bifur-
cation in the traditional sense should only be granted when damage claims are ex-
tensive and thus present a discrete issue for determination. 16  However, while not
finding that standard met in the particular facts of the case, the court still adopted a
solution reconciling the interests of both parties and the court: if the jury found va-
lidity and infringement, only then would extensive discovery and introduction of
159 Id. (quoting Molly Mosley-Goren et al., Patent Opinions and Litigation: The Client's Choice of
Counsel, 715 PLI/PAT. 425, 437 (2002)).
160 Quantum, 940 F.2d at 644 n.2.
161 Kos Pharms., Inc. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 218 F.R.D. 387, 392 (S.D.N.Y. 2003), clarified, 293 F.
Supp. 2d 370 (2003).
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evidence regarding willfulness be permitted, and the same jury would be used for
both the liability and the willfulness phases of the trial.1 62 This creative solution
should be considered even if the traditional form of bifurcation is rejected.
ii) In camera review
Another procedural tool the Federal Circuit has approved is in camera review
of disputed documents.1 63 Regardless of the substantive approach to the waiver de-
termination taken by the trial judge, this tool allows the judge to make informed de-
cisions about what documents are appropriate for disclosure. 164 Trial judges should
utilize this tool in all cases in which a dispute arises concerning a specific docu-
ment. However, note that this procedural tool is particularly effective in the gate-
keeper scenario by eliminating bias in the gatekeeper.
iii) Waiver and admissibility hearings
The procedural context in which the issue of waiver arises is usually a sepa-
rate pretrial hearing. These hearings usually originate on a motion of one of the
parties: for example when a patent owner files a motion to compel or when an al-
leged willful infringer files a motion for a protective order. The resulting hearing
regards the discoverability of documents. Such hearings are obviously useful and
necessary to resolve the question of waiver as it applies to specific cases.
A determination as to the proper extent of waiver does not necessarily deter-
mine the admissibility of the same documents. Even when admissible, as alluded to
above, in the context of a patent infringement trial with an allegation of willfulness,
evidence related to willfulness may unfairly prejudice a jury on the predicate issue
of liability during trial. If a trial is not bifurcated, such undue prejudice might ren-
der the evidence inadmissible. 165 The alleged willful infringer might also raise nu-
merous other evidentiary objections. Thus, a last procedural protection worth men-
tioning is a hearing on admissibility. Even though judges could decide the issues of
waiver and admissibility could theoretically be decided at the same time (especially
with the use of in camera review), a more appropriate course is to have separate
hearings on waiver and admissibility. While many of the same arguments might be
employed in both hearings, the patent owner will not be able to adequately prepare
arguments for admissibility without seeing the documents at issue.
162 Id.
163 Id. at 644 ("Procedurally, the court's inspecting the documents in camera before ruling on the mo-
tions to compel production and defer trial on willfulness was certainly proper and de-
serves emulation.").
164 In camera review may also inform a judge as to when disclosure is appropriate. See, e.g., Plas-
manet, Inc. v. Apax Partners, Inc., No. 02 Civ.9290 BSJ THK, 2003 WL 21800981, at *2
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 5, 2003) (conducting an in camera review of an opinion before deciding to delay
disclosure until after resolution of dispositive motions).
165 See FED. R. EVID. 403.
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C. The underlying difference of opinion
The three substantive approaches put forth by district courts reflect a lack of
agreement on the appropriate scope of waiver. However, the heart of the disagree-
ment among trial courts may be less about differing interpretations of Federal Cir-
cuit case law, 166 and more about varying levels of suspicion that "legal gamesman-
ship [has] creep[ed] into the practice of rendering infringement and validity
opinions.'
167
Courts invoking the complete waiver demonstrate a high level of suspicion
that opinion writers may be hiding something. Wishing to hold opinion writers ac-
countable for their work, these judges effectively convert opinion counsel into a
type of auditor accountable to the public. Viewing opinion writers as auditors may
reflect the idea that the public is the ultimate beneficiary of the patent system,
though patent owners and alleged infringers have an obvious pecuniary interest.
Thus, all documents are discoverable, and, when the fact-finder is a jury, the jury
will represent the public in reviewing the documents' contents. Another justifica-
tion for viewing opinion counsel as auditors is that no other mechanism effectively
ensures the candor of opinions.
On the one hand, if an alleged willful infringer asserts the advice-of-counsel
defense and loses at trial because the asserted opinion was a sham, the result is
probably in the public interest. If the alleged willful infringer and opinion counsel
conspired to produce the sham opinion, willfulness is an appropriate penalty. Even
if no conspiracy existed, however, a remedy for the client may be available; the
party adjudicated willful infringer may sue the opinion writer for malpractice. On
the other hand, the more important and more troubling story is when the alleged
willful infringer wins at trial on the willfulness issue despite the fact that the opin-
ion is a sham. In this case, the only course of action may be for the patent owner to
bring an antitrust or fraud action against the alleged willful infringer or the opinion
counsel. In short, a court that requires disclosure of opinion work product overpro-
tects against the latter scenario by rooting out sham opinions.
In contrast, courts invoking the communications waiver, and to a lesser extent
courts invoking the communications/fact work-product waiver, demonstrate confi-
dence in the ethical and professional responsibility of opinion writers. Setting aside
the various other complexities presented by the opinion-of-counsel defense, a Fed-
eral Circuit decision adopting one of the general approaches to the scope of waiver
may also reflect that court's level of trust in the ethical and professional responsi-
bility of opinion writers.
166 Contra Goff, supra note 57, at 12.
167 Novartis Pharm., 206 F.R.D. at 399; see also Chimie, 218 F.R.D. at 420 (stating that "a general
rule of waiver that assumes deceit" does not "satisfy the legitimate discovery interests of the par-
ties").
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However, one can envision other solutions to the perceived problems of legal
gamesmanship and sham opinions. 68  For example, legislation or Patent and
Trademark Office ("PTO") regulation could be drafted to govern the rendering of
patent opinions. Newly drafted standards could also resolve disclosure issues,
could require the filing of all patent opinions, and/or could create a third party re-
view system.
Consider a review system in which a third party, such as the PTO, certified or
otherwise monitored the quality and accuracy of patent opinions. Such a system
could require the PTO to investigate and enforce standards articulated in regula-
tions, wherein the PTO might require the disclosure of documents otherwise pro-
tected by the attorney-client privilege and work-product immunity before rendering
a decision in certification. The PTO could require the filing of all patent opinions,
which could be kept confidential pending the development of litigation or negotia-
tions. Alternatively, such a system could be voluntary, wherein a party could
choose whether or not to have an opinion officially reviewed for possible certifica-
tion. Again, the PTO might require the disclosure of otherwise-protected docu-
ments before it would render a decision on certification.
Either a mandatory or a voluntary system of review would produce some ef-
fect. For instance, certification of a patent opinion might result in it receiving offi-
cial or unofficial recognition that would give that opinion more weight in the eyes
of parties, judges, or juries. A review that did not certify an opinion would obvi-
ously give that opinion less weight. In other words, a review system such as this
one would provide an alternate way to ferret out sham opinions.
The review system could also provide an avenue for incidental benefits. The
PTO could keep track of the performance of different patent attorneys and law
firms. Even if the PTO only required the filing of opinions, the PTO could develop
statistics to show how often opinions were later rejected by judges or juries. The
system would create a market incentive for attorneys and firms to chose reputable
counsel who would in turn have incentives not to trade on their reputations. Of
course, this market incentive already exists in the current system, but the review
process or a requirement to file opinions would provide a more efficient method of
rendering such indicators.
Courts do not have the institutional capacity to effectuate any of these pro-
posed alternative solutions. Such sweeping change to the patent opinion landscape
would require legislative and regulatory intervention. But a review system such as
the one discussed could allow the legislature or the PTO to provide an answer to the
question this article analyzes: the proper scope of waiver. While merely substitut-
ing a decision-maker does not address the appropriateness of disclosing documents
168 The insight of Harvard Law School Professor David B. Wilkins generated many of the ideas set
forth in the following several paragraphs.
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otherwise protected by the attorney-client privilege and work-product immunity, if
legal gamesmanship is what judges actually fear and if an efficient method for de-
tecting sham opinions can be created, a legislative decision to implement a review
system might be appropriate.
IV. Resolving the Issue: Why and How
A. The implications of an uncertain scope of waiver
The complex and uncertain waiver doctrine discussed above results in an un-
certain attorney-client privilege and an uncertain work-product doctrine. These un-
certainties effectively emasculate the purposes of the attorney-client privilege and
work-product doctrine by undermining the very existence of the protections them-
selves. Consider the following:
[1]f the purpose of the attorney-client privilege is to be served, the attorney and client
must be able to predict with some degree of certainty whether particular discussions will
be protected. An uncertain privilege, or one which purports to be certain but results in
widely varying applications by the courts, is little better than no privilege at all. 69
This reasoning applies equally to the work-product doctrine.
In fact, an uncertain waiver doctrine is worse than no doctrine at all because
of the enormous inefficiencies the uncertainty creates. First, consider the effect on
parties and attorneys. Assuming a party seeking an opinion of counsel has knowl-
edge of the uncertainty in the waiver doctrine, the party will consciously act as if
the least possible protection exists. Fearing later disclosure, the party might with-
hold details that would have otherwise been disclosed to the attorney. Oral com-
munications will occur more often and less will be committed to paper. The pur-
poses of the attorney-client privilege-full and frank communication between
attorneys and their clients-might therefore be lost.
Next, consider the effect on the attorney contacted by the party. Knowing the
uncertainty of the waiver doctrine, the attorney will also consciously act as if the
least possible protection will be afforded. However, the attorney will be affected in
terms of communications as well as work. The attorney will commit little to paper
until confirming that a satisfactory opinion can be written. Even then, the attorney
will try to limit work product to publicly available information, such as the patent's
prosecution history. Again, the goal of the work-product doctrine-proper prepara-
tion of a client's case-might be lost if appropriate information and arguments are
not developed. The inefficiencies in this system clearly undermine the enterprise.
Also consider the effect on the judicial system itself. Here, uncertainty in the
waiver doctrine wastes enormous amounts of resources. The scope of waiver is re-
169 Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 393.
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litigated by parties and reinvented by courts repeatedly. 170 Each time the advice-of-
counsel defense is asserted, both parties draw on extensive precedent to support
their positions, and typically a magistrate judge 171 is forced to wade through the
volumes of cases on the issue and reinvent the scope of the waiver yet again. Be-
sides inefficiency, uncertainty also causes parties to lose confidence in the effec-
tiveness of courts to dispense justice. Decisions are seen as arbitrarily decided.
Uncertainty, inefficiency, and injustice are evidenced by the extent of dis-
agreement among judges regarding the proper scope of waiver. Of course, dis-
agreements among districts is common.1 72 One might think that district judges ac-
cept decisions made by other judges in the same district. This presumption is
wrong; disagreements even exist within district courts. 173  In one instance, dis-
agreement existed between a magistrate judge and a district judge working on the
same case. 174 In another instance, a judge was asked to reconsider a decision he
made seven years earlier on the proper scope of waiver.1 75 Fortunately, he de-
clined. 17
6
B. Obtaining appellate review
Ultimately, the debate raging in the district courts cries out for appellate re-
view regardless of the substantive decision reached on appeal. However, signifi-
cant obstacles stand in the way of obtaining effective appellate review, so parties
170 Cf Akeva, 243 F. Supp. 2d at 419 ("The matter before the Court is an increasingly familiar one in
patent litigation."); Chimie, 218 F.R.D. at 417 ("In few, if any, areas of the law has the tail taken
to wagging the dog as vigorously as in the privilege waiver disputes endemic to patent infringe-
ment cases."); Eco Mfg., 2003 WL 1888988, at *8 ("To be sure, the [communications waiver] ap-
proach ... creates some risk that intentional infringement (of patent or trademark rights) could be
obscured by reliance upon deliberately incompetent opinions.") (trademark case); KW Muth, 219
F.R.D. at 576 ("The opinions ... suggest that some courts may have developed a degree of skepti-
cism about the integrity of patent counsel in their highly contentious field that provides great fi-
nancial rewards to the victors.").
171 Of the twenty-one decisions (not including Handgards, 413 F. Supp. 926, 192 U.S.P.Q. 316 (anti-
trust case) and Dunhall Pharm., 994 F. Supp. 1202, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d 1365 (both magistrate and dis-
trict opinions)) cited supra at Part III.B. 1. n. 92, 101, 115, magistrate judges penned thriteen while
district judges wrote only eight.
172 Compare Michlin, 208 F.R.D. 172 (communications waiver case decided by E.D. Mich.) with
Chiron, 179 F. Supp. 2d 1182 (complete waiver case decided by C.D. Cal.).
173 Compare Thorn EMIN. Am., 837 F. Supp. 616, 29 U.S.P.Q.2d 1872 (communications waiver case
decided by D. Del.) with Novartis Pharm., 206 F.R.D. 396 (complete waiver, also decided by D.
Del.).
174 Dunhall Pharm., 994 F. Supp. at 1205-06, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1368-69 (district judge's opinion
adopting complete waiver despite magistrate judge's opinion adopting communications waiver).
175 Compare Micron Separations, 159 F.R.D. 361 with VLT, Inc. v. Artesyn Techs., Inc., 198 F.
Supp. 2d 56 (D. Mass. 2002).
171 VLT, Inc., 198 F. Supp. 2d at 57-58 ("I stand by the decision I made in the case of Micron Separa-
tions .... ).
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that find themselves litigating this issue must explore every possible way to appeal
waiver determinations.
Before exploring the numerous methods of obtaining appellate review, how-
ever, note that the Federal Circuit will hear any appeal related to the scope of
waiver resulting from the assertion of the advice-of-counsel defense to a claim of
willful patent infringement.177 Federal Circuit law will probably apply since the is-
sue arguably implicates substantive patent law. 178 Indeed, the Federal Circuit was
formed in 1982 in response to a similar situation: uncertainty and forum shopping
due to varying judicial interpretations of patent laws in the appellate circuits.179
1. Traditional appeal
The first and most obvious method of obtaining appellate review is an appeal
after final judgment. 180 However, the Federal Circuit recognizes this traditional
form of appellate review is inadequate in the context of waiver determinations.' 8'
After final judgment, privileged information has already been disclosed, and no
adequate remedy is available to undo any resulting harm. 182 Furthermore, it is sub-
stantially important to the administration of justice to maintain the proper extent of
the attorney-client privilege.
183
171 See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291, 1292(c), 1295(a) (2000).
178 See Dentsply, 132 F. Supp. 2d at 313-315; see also In re Spalding Sports Worldwide, Inc., 203
F.3d 800, 803-04, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1747, 1749 (Fed. Cir. 2000). But see Chimie, 218 F.R.D.
at 419 n.4.
179 See Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25 (1982); H.R. RPT.
No. 97-312, at 20-22 (1981); S. RPT. No. 97-275, at 5 (1981).
180 Note that courts do not normally consider discovery orders applied to nonparties to be "final deci-
sions," a requirement for traditional appellate jurisdiction (see 28 U.S.C. §§ 1295, 1291), since re-
fusing to comply with a discovery order and appealing a subsequent contempt citation is consid-
ered to be an adequate alternative that provides effective review of the order. Connaught Labs.,
Inc. v. Smithkline Beecham P.L.C., 165 F.3d 1368, 1369-70, 49 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1540, 1541-
42 (Fed. Cir. 1999). Therefore, in the absence of a contempt citation, appeal of a discovery order
as applied to the attorney probably must wait until final judgment.
181 The Federal Circuit has recognized that waiting until final judgment to appeal discovery orders
implicating privileges is ineffective. See In re Regents of Univ. of Cal., 101 F.3d 1386, 1387, 49
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1784, 1785 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (citing Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Decker,
423 F.2d 487, 492 (7th Cir. 1970), affdper curiam, 400 U.S. 348 (1971)); Connaught Labs., 165
F.3d at 1370. But see Quantum, 940 F.2d at 644 (order compelling discovery over attorney-client
privilege and work-product immunity claims effectively reviewable on appeal from final judg-
ment).
182 Regents of Univ. of Cal., 101 F.3d at 1387, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1785 (citing Harper & Row Publish-
ers, 423 F.2d at 492).
183 id.
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2. Interlocutory appeal
While ["controlling question of law"] is often understood to mean that resolu-
tion of the issue will resolve the action entirely, it has a much broader meaning in
the context of section 1292(b). Of course, if resolution of the question being chal-
lenged An alleged willful infringer might instead seek interlocutory appeal of a
waiver determination. A district judge, under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), may certify for
immediate appeal an order "not otherwise appealable" when the order "involves a
controlling question of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of
opinion and.. . an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the ul-
timate termination of the litigation."
'1 84
Although the Federal Circuit has not reviewed a certified interlocutory appeal
of a waiver determination related to the advice-of-counsel defense to a willfulness
charge, it has reviewed a denial of certification for interlocutory appeal in the same
circumstances. In Quantum Corp. v. Tandon Corp.,185 the court affirmed the denial
"because, while important, the questions of law involved may not be controlling
and in any event, [their] early appellate resolution would not likely materially ad-
vance the ultimate termination of the litigation."' 186 Beyond this conclusory lan-
guage, however, the court did not explain its holding of denial affirming the certifi-
cation.
The Federal Circuit should more fully consider the issue at stake in Quantum;
indeed, it may be forced to do so if a district court certifies an interlocutory appeal
of a waiver determination. A large factor supporting certification, and one not ad-
dressed in Quantum, is the increasingly conflicting treatments of the question of
law in the district courts. District court decisions vary on the issue of the scope of
waiver resulting from the advice-of-counsel defense, so much so that it is obvious
that there is a substantial ground for difference of opinion. The appropriateness of
interlocutory appeal is also reinforced by the fact that the scope of waiver would
still be one of first impression in the Federal Circuit, twelve years after the Quan-
tum court declined to review the question.
Another reason the Federal Circuit should reexamine this issue is that in
Quantum the court may have overlooked one interpretation of the statute governing
interlocutory appeal. The cursory treatment of the issue may reflect the statutory
language, which on its face appears to foreclose interlocutory appeal of a waiver
determination. According to the statute, only a "controlling question of law" may
be certified.18 7 A waiver determination, while a question of law, does not automati-
cally terminate a case, at least not to the same extent as determinations of standing,
184 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b).
185 Id.
186 Id. at 644 (internal quotations omitted).
is 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b).
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jurisdiction, and venue, a few of the traditional matters appropriate for interlocutory
appeal.1 88 However, immediate termination of the case may not be an actual re-
quirement:
on appeal will terminate the action in the district court, it is clearly controlling .... Un-
der the statutory framework, however, a question of law need not completely dispose of
the litigation in order to be "controlling." Because the courts treat the statutory criteria
for discretionary appeals in a unitary manner, they look for a "controlling" question that
has the potential of substantially accelerating disposition of the litigation.1
89
Thus, some courts "require only that the appeal present a controlling question
of law on an issue whose determination may materially advance the ultimate termi-
nation of the case."'190 Consistent with this interpretation, several appellate courts
have recognized that interlocutory appeals of discovery orders are sometimes
proper. 191 If the Federal Circuit adopted this view, interlocutory appeal of waiver
determinations would be proper.
Admittedly, an alternate understanding of Quantum is that the Federal Circuit
does in fact require that the appealed question immediately terminate the litigation,
even if it did not say as much. 92 In short, the issue is debatable, largely because of
the Federal Circuit's summary affirmation in Quantum. Therefore, the Federal Cir-
cuit should revisit the issue.
3. Cohen collateral order doctrine
Yet another option would be for the Federal Circuit to review a waiver deter-
mination under the Cohen collateral order doctrine. 193 This doctrine enables appel-
late review of an order that conclusively determines an important, disputed issue
that is completely separate from the merits of the case and effectively unreviewable
on appeal from a final judgment. 194
However, again in Quantum, the Federal Circuit specifically rejected the use
of the collateral order doctrine to gain appellate review of a waiver determination in
188 See 19 JAMES W. MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 203.31[2] (2002).
189 Id.
190 Id. at §203.31[3].
191 See id. and cases cited therein.
192 Other unwritten arguments might indirectly confirm this interpretation of Quantum. For example,
matters submitted to a district court's discretion are ordinarily not certifiable (id.) and a waiver de-
termination is in fact discretionary. See United States v. Ziegler Bolt and Parts Co., 111 F.3d 878,
882 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
193 See generally Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 545-47 (1949).
194 Quantum, 940 F.2d at 643 n. I (citing Gulfstream Aerospace Corp. v. Mayacamas Corp., 485 U.S.
271, 276 (1988)).
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the willfulness context. 195 The court reasoned that waiver determinations are effec-
tively reviewable on appeal from a final judgment.196 Furthermore, in a footnote.
the court suggested that these determinations "may present issues not completely,
separate from the merits and thus ... are not truly collateral under ... the Cohen
doctrine."' 97 The court essentially adhered to the general rule that discovery orders
are not appealable orders. 1
98
Thus, to grant review of a waiver determination under the collateral order
doctrine, the Federal Circuit would have to reverse its decision in Quantum. The
Federal Circuit should do just that. First, in Quantum the court did not deny that
waiver determinations are important, disputed issues. 199 Indeed, in light of the nu-
merous and distinct trial court decisions in this area, one could hardly question ei-
ther the significance parties place on this issue or the disagreement that exists
among trial courts.
Second, the court did not unequivocally decide whether waiver determina-
tions present an issue completely separate from the merits.200 The court's language
on this factor was ambiguous, conclusory, and present only in a footnote. 20 1 Fur-
thermore, the effect of waiver determinations on the ex ante expectations of parties
and opinion drafters presents an issue completely separate from the merits of any
one particular case, especially given the present uncertainty in this area of the law.
Third, the sole ground the court relied upon to deny review-that waiver de-
terminations are effectively reviewable on appeal from a final judgment-has been
recanted by the Federal Circuit. More recent Federal Circuit decisions admit that
waiting until final judgment to appeal discovery orders implicating protected mate-
rial is ineffective because irreparable harm occurs when the information in question
is released prior to appeal. 20 2 In fact, waiver determinations are effectively unre-
viewable on appeal from a final judgment. Although traditional appeals are techni-
cally possible, almost twelve years have passed since Quantum was decided, and
the scope of waiver resulting from reliance on advice of counsel has still not been
reviewed on appeal from a final judgment despite the plethora of district court deci-
sions on the issue.
' Id. at 644.
196 Id. But see Regents of Univ. of Cal., 101 F.3d at 1387, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1785 (citing Harper &
Row Publishers, 423 F.2d at 492); Connaught Labs., 165 F.3d at 1370,40 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1542.
197 Quantum, 940 F.2d at 644 n.2.
198 See id.
9 See id. at 643.
200 Id. at 644 n.2.
201 id.
212 Regents of Univ. of Cal., 101 F.3d at 1387, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1985 (citing Harper & Row Publish-
ers, 423 F.2d at 492); Connaught Labs., 165 F.3d at 1370, 49 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1541.
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In short, the Federal Circuit should reverse Quantum and follow the example
of the Third Circuit, which has recognized appellate review of attorney-client privi-
lege and work-product doctrine issues under the collateral order doctrine.203 Given
the Federal Circuit's desire to keep the class of cases falling within the collateral
order doctrine small and the concomitant fear of "a flood of piecemeal appeals, 20 4
the Federal Circuit could limit such a decision to the particular facts of the case, in-
cluding the present disarray regarding the scope of waiver resulting from the ad-
vice-of-counsel defense.
4. Mandamus
Mandamus is another tool available to an alleged willful infringer to obtain
appellate review of a trial court decision on the scope of waiver.20 5 While a party
seeking a writ of mandamus bears the burden of proving no other course of relief is
attainable and that its right to a writ is "clear and indisputable,, 20 6 the Federal Cir-
cuit has recognized that "[t]he remedy of mandamus may be appropriate to prevent
the wrongful exposure of privileged communications.2 0 7 Mandamus may also be
appropriate when an issue of first impression is involved, attorney-client privilege
would be lost if review were denied, and resolution of the issue would avoid the
development of a doctrine that undermines the privilege.08
Relief in the form of mandamus may be appropriate here. Traditional appel-
late review of decisions on the scope of waiver only rarely occur, and even if re-
view occurred after a final judgment, the attorney-client privilege and possibly
work-product immunity would be irretrievably lost without adequate remedy. Fur-
thermore, the scope of the waiver resulting from the assertion of the advice-of-
counsel defense to an allegation of willful infringement would present an issue of
first impression. In light of the various trial court decisions in this area, resolution
of the issue would prevent further undermining of these doctrines.
However, the Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit have held that a decision
committed to the discretion of the trial court cannot be said to give litigants a "clear
203 In re Ford Motor Co., 110 F.3d 954, 964 (3d Cir. 1997); In re Chambers Dev. Co., 148 F.3d 214,
226 (3d Cir. 1998).
204 Quantum, 940 F.2d at 644 n.2.
205 A writ of mandamus is an order issued by a higher court commanding a lower court to act. See 28
U.S.C. § 165 1(a) (2000).
206 In re Smithkline Beecham Corp., No. 01-632, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 29637, at *7 (Fed. Cir. Nov.
1, 2000) (quoting Allied Chem. Corp. v. Daiflon, Inc., 449 U.S. 33, 35 (1980)).
207 Id. at *6; see also Spalding Sports Worldwide, 203 F.3d at 804-05, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1750-51
(Fed. Cir. 2000) (granting mandamus to prevent improper disclosure); Regents of Univ. of Cal.,
101 F.3d at 1387, 1391, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1784.
208 Regents of Univ. of Cal., 101 F.3d at 1388, 40 U.S.P.Q. at 1785.
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and indisputable" right to a writ.20 9 "[O]nly when there has been a clear abuse of
discretion or usurpation of judicial authority in the grant or denial of the order" is
mandamus appropriate.210 The scope of waiver is a decision within the discretion
of the trial court.21 1 Therefore, the district court decision on the scope of waiver
would have to be a clear abuse of discretion. Given the diverse district court deci-
sions in this area, convincing the Federal Circuit that a trial court ruling on the
scope of waiver was an abuse of discretion or was clearly and indisputably wrong
may be difficult.
Nevertheless, a decision to exercise mandamus would be consistent with Fed-
eral Circuit precedent, which includes an issuance of a writ of mandamus to a dis-
trict court to vacate a magistrate judge's order to disclose an invention record over
the attorney-client privilege.212 Mandamus would also be consistent with Third
Circuit precedent, which recognizes that mandamus is an appropriate procedural
mechanism to review attorney-client privilege and work product doctrine protection
issues.2t 3
5. Appeal of a contempt citation
A last procedure an attorney might take before disclosing work product is to
refuse to comply with a discovery order and to appeal a subsequent contempt cita-
tion.21 4 For obvious reasons this procedure is not recommended, even as a last re-
sort.
V. Conclusion
The Federal Circuit has abdicated its authority to govern a substantive issue
that is unique to patent law: what scope of waiver results from the advice-of-
counsel defense to a charge of willful patent infringement. As a result, parties and
trial courts redundantly reinvent the scope of the waiver, and district courts have
splintered on the issue. The different approaches to the wavier doctrine may reflect
different levels of confidence judges place in the ethical and professional responsi-
bilities of opinion writers. Regardless of whatever substantive approach might be
adopted on appeal, for the sake of clarity in the law, certainty in the expectations of
parties seeking opinions of counsel, efficiency, judicial economy, and justice, the
Federal Circuit should finally review a decision in this area of patent law. The
209 See Smithkline Beecham, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 29637, at *7 (quoting Allied Chem. Corp., 449
U.S. at 35).
210 Spalding Sports Worldwide, 203 F.3d at 804, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1750 (quoting Connaught Labs.,
165 F.3d at 1370, 49 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1541).
211 See Ziegler Bolt & Parts, 11I F.3d at 882.
212 Spalding Sports Worldwide, Inc., 203 F.3d at 804-05, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1750-51.
213 Chambers Dev. Co., 148 F.3d at 226 n.9.
214 Connaught Labs., 165 F.3d at 1370, 49 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1541.
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Federal Circuit should assert its jurisdiction under interlocutory appeal, the Cohen
collateral order doctrine, or by considering a writ of mandamus. In the meantime,
magistrate and district judges should bifurcate trials involving willfulness and opin-
ions-of-counsel and certify interlocutory appeals of waiver determinations.
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